III
INNER DARKNESS: THE UNCONSCIOUS AS A MORAL PROBLEM

(From *Insearch* by James Hillman)

A GREAT difficulty in pastoral work according to the lay imagination is the discrepancy naturally arising between morality as preached and morality as practiced. The minister is supposed to be the paradigm of a split between practice and preaching. The "new morality" of the "new reformation" has brought this conflict into focus and is attempting a new solution.

However, the same shadows are arising in analytical work. Just as one can discuss ethics in the legal, medical, or public service professions, so now as the new analysis separates itself from its psychiatric background, becoming a field of own, it is beginning to take up the issue of analytical ethics.

The moral problems that constellate in the fields dedicated to the service of higher ends are particularly thorny, the split between good and evil particularly peculiar. It seems that as we try to bring light, serve truth, and do good, the opposite side grows with the same intensity. This phenomenon is so independent of our conscious intention, so difficult to face steadily and to cope with, that gradually a dissociation occurs, splitting us apart. At best, we hold the tension and suffer moral pain; at worst, we repress the split and the world suffers it as hypocrisy and betrayal. The split between preaching and practice, consciousness and shadow, hand of wisdom and hand of folly, will hardly be solved by choosing one at the cost of the other. To force practice into the mold of preaching as did the old morality, or to let preaching be led and limited by the facts of practice as would the new morality, only subdues conflict without resolving it. Both preaching and practice are roofed in the same human psyche and have authenticity.

Both are realms of action, and perhaps the left hand and the right are obliged to keep their secrets from each other. Rather than choosing one at the expense of the other, there might be another solution. This would be the development of what lies in between, the dark inner space where the heart is, an approach to the cultivation of which is one intention of this chapter.

In the popular mind, those in the pulpit are supposed to be identified with morality, while those in the analytical chair are supposed to be on the side of the id, of unbridled desire, and against morality. One therefore expects the conflicts of religion and psychology to appear not only in the question of who has claim to the soul but between those who uphold morality and those who would analyze it away. If we look more closely at this, we find the sides sometimes curiously reversed. Today's morality as expounded from some pulpits has a remarkably liberal note with an eighteenth-century openness to life and love. To escape the dead hand of Victorianism, some theological morality in an attempt to move forward seems to have moved backward to the time before Victoria.

When it is held that God is as much in the dining hall as He is in church, is as much in human relationships as He is in the God-man relationship, and when the justification of acts becomes based upon the depth of love between persons, we have given to Augustine's *Love and do what thou wilt*, and his *Only one thing is really enjoined upon the Christian—namely, love*, an astonishingly contemporary twist. Upon love alone all questions of morality are to be decided: "For nothing else makes a thing right or wrong." One wonders who now is leading the assault upon the old morality—perhaps the new theology itself?

In today's high-pressure, Mr. Cool world, the boy-Fausts with barbered heads and unlined faces are in the corridors of power. They are appointed to High Government; they disburse the Funds of Foundations; they run the Corporations. Just as the natural science model of thinking affects psychology and theology, so too does this technician-physicist model of man affect psychologist and clergyman. We do not want to be

old-fashioned, no longer with it, out. And I believe that the new morality of which Bishop Robinson has written is an attempt to keep in and with it, which may be rationalized as "abreast of the times." The churches want to go with life, true to mid-twentieth-century life, and its ministers do not want to take up moral positions which are split from this life. Therefore this new twentieth-century morality is a theological cloak for the modern trend. *Honest to God* states

But there is no need to prove that a revolution is required in morals. It has long since broken out; and it is no "reluctant revolution." The wind of change here is a gale. (p. I05)

I A. Nygren, Agape and Eros (Philadelphia, I953), p. 454.
s]. A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (SCM paperback), p. II9.

This is a justification ex post facto, a recognition of a revolution and of a new regime not *de jure*, but *de facto*. One sails with the gale rather than being toppled over like the rigid steeple whose old stones are crumbling. This new morality is supposed to have arisen from the work of Freud. The discoveries of depth psychology are the "scientific" background for the new liberation. But I would like to show that analysis is a moral procedure, requiring a morality, and that this morality of analysis may even point a way out of the dilemma of old morality versus new morality.

The confrontation with the inner world in the ways we have already touched upon may at first be an exciting, inflating experience. A door opens and another world is revealed. Suddenly things long forgotten, or long remembered as insignificant, take on sharp poignancy. Childhood is revisited, and one can go home again. Truths drilled in become truths that flower; and even what one has been preaching to others takes on new sense for oneself. This tends to happen again and again in therapy: in the beginning a person cannot wait for the next dream, the next revelation from the unconscious, or the next analytical hour. At last

things are falling into place and there is energy to undertake. The initial contact with the unconscious is a vitalizing experience, as if a fountain long clogged through neglect flows again. And one finds just such energetic images: a stream bed now has water in it, a stagnant pond begins to flow, a herd of animals, a strong horse in a green field, a glacier melts, or engines, dynamos, mechanical turbines, or departure docks for ocean liners, railroad stations, airports, frontiers. A journey is about to begin, but the excitement and inflation appropriate to the beginning and without which the beginning could hardly be undertaken often turns—just on the other side of the customs barrier, after the ship leaves the harbor or the train the station—this journey turns into a perilous voyage, an adventure through the sea at night or through a desert where one is beset with the full uncanny force of the unknown. Or then the drunkard appears who cannot handle his spirit, or the nouveau riche, the big spender, the rude millionaire, the locomotive engineer, or all the inflated leaders of politics and community. The new energy has been taken the wrong way, assimilated by the ego as power and drivenness and outer show.

Freud was the first to describe what is to be encountered when the door is opened into the unconscious and one descends, when one actually confronts, by immersion in, the inner darkness. And it is dark! The unconscious, as we saw in the previous chapter, cannot be conscious; the moon has its dark side, the sun goes down and cannot shine everywhere at once, and even God has two hands. Attention and focus require some things to be out of the field of vision, to remain in the dark. One cannot look both ways at once. It is dark, however, for two reasons: the wòrst because it is necessarily repressed—the world which Freud has so carefully investigated; and secondly, it is dark because it has not yet had time nor place to emerge into the light. This, too, is the inner darkness, the earth or ground of one's new being, the part which is *in potentia*, and which Jungian psychology would cultivate. It is the darkness of the Past and the darkness of the Future. Behind the repressed darkness and the personal shadow—that which has been and is rotting

and that which is not yet and is germinating—is the archetypal darkness, the principle of not-being, which has been named and described as the Devil, as Evil, as Original Sin, as Death, as existential Nothingness, as *prima materia*. We shall come back to this soon.

The experience of the inner darkness, as Freud described it, is the vivid confrontation with one's own repressed nature. The beast emerges from his lair where he has long lain sleeping and a man has night terrors, awakens in a sweat. A corpse or ancestral mummy resurrects. A vast swamp appears behind the Church or behind one's father's house, from which crawls a prehistoric monster with an elongated red phallic neck, and the person who denies his beast wonders how he could ever have dreamt such a thing. A criminal, an idiot child, a piece of feces inside the water spigot staining the fresh water as it flows, an older hardened homosexual, a Nazi—one after another, like a police line-up, they wait for identification and acknowledgment: Yes, this too is mine. "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren. . . ."

At these moments, when one meets face to face the perverse and amoral creatures who have been inhabiting other parts of the building, the homilies which are usually understood by us in terms of how to be with others become lessons of how to be with ourselves. And suddenly the difficulty of those lessons comes home, for somehow one squirms having to acknowledge the dark truth about oneself. I mean by this not the general idea that "yes, we are all sinners" and born in sin, but that we are specifically responsible for specific actions and for specific character traits which stand contradictory to the light side of ourselves.

This is of course a moral struggle. Remembrance of sin, remorse, and repentance become the living language of an analysis. The woman begins to see what she has been doing out of selfishness all these years to her husband, how she has never really been interested in him. She has only been interested in his interest in her. Or the mother, now a grandmother, catches glimpses through her dreams of her witchery and power tricks with her children. And a man runs across a confidence man in his dreams, a mountebank, a slick salesman, a sociopathic chancer,

and he sees how he has slipped out and danced away from his betrayals and years of using other people.

But one can feel a moral failure *vis-á-vis* oneself. This is more difficult and brings with it new moral problems. For one can feel the need to face having wronged others more easily than the need to face having wronged oneself. Collective morality approves of self-sacrifice. We wrong and hate ourselves with full moral sanction of the community. Altruism is said to be the opposite of egoism. Yet, through the unconscious, one discovers that much altruism is sham and compensation if the right sort of egoism has been failed. Rather than living that egoism which is simply faith in, hope for, and love of oneself, we keep the egoistic child in us alive, coddling it with childishness, thereby stunting our own potency. To come to full stature might mean putting away all childish things, and this sacrifice not even the community demands. It tolerates all foibles and even perversities rather than have in its midst the grandeur of individuality.

Collective morality too often finds little place for the man who has that self-love, that confidence and strength, to come into his kingdom and take possession of it. He is met with envy. As Nietzsche noted, there is ample room in the Christian community for the meek and the weak; the last commandment about covetousness is easy to keep in a collective where only the poor in spirit abound.

When one has a moral obligation to oneself, figures appear in the shadow which represent positive possibilities of one's own nature, potentialities that have not been given a chance. I am guilty not only toward the past, but toward my own potentialities. The shadow often divides between an obedient and dull bourgeois figure who is collectively approved and uncreative, and a bearded beatnik, a rebel or hobo, a fellow with flair but no "pad" to call his own. And again there is a moral problem: for to whom does one give credit at this juncture—the sheriff or the outlaw, the professor or the freshman, the cardinal or the defrocked priest? Who is positive and who is negative? The one-sided light of ego-consciousness implies that darkness means neglect. And it is

the neglected elements which appear in the shadow. Where the ego has neglected its own virtues and talents, then these virtues and talents will be incorporated into figures of the dreams who have become social outcasts—that is, cast out by the fixed laws of the way in which we have set up our inner society. Then these potentials must appear as outlaws, misfits, even cripples or lunatics. Healing these, the blind and the lepers, raising the dead, becomes an inner necessity to bring health to the personality.

Symbols of the inner darkness which a person experiences may be seen not only against the personal sins and crimes of an individual's life, but also in the broader view of human development in general. Hercules had to clean the filth of the Augean stables; he had to divert whole rivers of energy to accomplish this impossible labor. He had as well to slay the lion of his own ambition, his own will to power, before he could dirty himself in those stables. Ulysses had to meet the giant of the hungry eye, the single-minded demon of compulsion, before he could proceed on his way. Somewhere there is a monster to be met, a beast to be slain, a drive to be overcome. Somewhere there is an angel to be grappled with before one can ford the river. And when one is alone in a desert, whether the modern one of the suburb or office building or the ancient one of the early Church fathers, all sorts of demons set on one, temptations, seductions, perversions, projections, illusions. There is always a background to every complaint brought, and the more overwhelming and fascinating the complaint, the more sure we can be that there is an archetypal background which is using a symptom for a symbol, and which, if better understood, is not merely a pathological suffering but may become a religious experience.

The cure of the shadow is on the one hand a moral problem, that is, recognition of what we have repressed, how we perform our repressions, how we rationalize and deceive ourselves, what sort of goals we have and what we have hurt, even maimed, in the name of these goals. On the other hand, the cure of the shadow is a problem of love. How far can our love extend to the broken and ruined parts of ourselves, the disgusting

and perverse? How much charity and compassion have we for our own weakness and sickness? How far can we build an inner society on the principle of love, allowing a place for everyone? And I use the term "cure of the shadow" to emphasize the importance of love. If we approach ourselves to cure ourselves, putting "me" in the center, it too often degenerates into the aim of curing the ego—getting stronger, better, growing in accord with the ego's goals, which are often mechanical copies of society's goals. But if we approach ourselves to cure those fixed intractable congenital weaknesses of stubbornness and blindness, of meanness and cruelty, of sham and pomp, we come up against the need for a new way of being altogether, in which the ego must serve and listen to and cooperate with a host of shadowy unpleasant figures and discover an ability to love even the least of these traits.

Loving oneself is no easy matter just because it means loving all of oneself, including the shadow where one is inferior and socially so unacceptable. The care one gives this humiliating part is also the cure. More: as the cure depends on care, so does caring sometimes mean nothing more than carrying. The first essential in redemption of the shadow is the ability to carry it along with you, as did the old Puritans, or the Jews in endless exile, daily aware of their sins, watching for the Devil, on guard lest they slip, a long existential trek with a pack of rocks on the back, with no one on whom to unload it and no sure goal at the end. Yet this carrying and caring cannot be programmatic, in order to develop, in order that the inferiority comply with the ego's goals, for this is hardly love. Loving the shadow may begin with carrying it, but even that is not enough. At one moment something else must break through, that laughing insight at the paradox of one's own folly which is also everyman's. Then may come the joyful acceptance of the rejected and inferior, a going with it and even a partial living of it. This love may even lead to an identification with and acting-out of the shadow, falling into its fascination. Therefore the moral dimension can never be abandoned. Thus is cure a paradox requiring two incommensurables: the moral recognition that these parts of me are burdensome and intolerable

and must change, and the loving laughing acceptance which takes them just as they are, joyfully, forever. One both tries hard and lets go, both judges harshly and joins gladly. Western moralism and Eastern abandon: each holds only one side of the truth.

I believe this paradoxical attitude of consciousness toward the shadow finds an archetypal example in Jewish religious mysticism, where God has two sides: one of moral righteousness and justice and the other of mercy, forgiveness, love. The Chassidim held the paradox, and the tales of them show their deep moral piety coupled with astounding delight in life.

The description Freud gave of the dark world which he found did not do justice to the psyche. The description was too rational. He did not grasp enough the paradoxical symbolic language in which the psyche speaks. He did not see fully that each image and each experience has a prospective aspect as well as a reductive aspect, a positive as well as a negative side. He did not see clearly enough the paradox that rotten garbage is also fertilizer, that childishness is also childlikeness, that polymorphous perversity is also joy and physical liberty, that the ugliest man is at the same time the redeemer in disguise.

In other words, Freud's description and Jung's description of the shadow are not two distinct and conflicting positions. Rather, Jung's position is to be superimposed upon Freud's, amplifying it, adding a dimension to it; and this dimension takes the same facts, the same discoveries, but shows them to be paradoxical symbols.

The same complementarity is true in regard to Freudian and Jungian rules of analysis. Freud had strict rules, and Freudians today continue with strict rules about the procedures of analysis, the relations between analyst and patient, and how the patient is to behave in the world during the time of his analysis. These rules are a new moral code, a new superego direction, modeled very much on the analysis pattern of

behavior and attitudes. Principally, they aim to guarantee that there will be a minimum of acting-out.

Because the forces of the shadow may be so dynamic on the one hand and so antisocial on the other, moral containment is required as long as the material which is being worked through has this primitive infantile shadow quality. However, from the Jungian point of view there is another reason for an analytical morality just as there is another aspect to the shadow. Morality reinforces the container within which the personality may transform. Let us look at this more closely.

Sexuality in particular is constellated by the shadow and takes on new life. Sexuality begins to carry the meanings of freedom and pleasure, of adulthood, potency, and creativity. The world becomes sexualized, and sexuality seems to confirm existence, to be ultimate truth in itself. Experiencing this aspect of the unconscious gives one the feeling that Freud was right through and through. Of course, the dangers of indiscriminate acting-out are immense. And a very difficult conflict breaks out between the new libido and the old morality. It seems as if this stage of working through the shadow has been occupying our society as a whole, especially in the last twenty years.

> Other moral issues, such as aggression, anger, pride and power, laziness, dishonesty and deceptive role-playing also belong to the shadows of feeling and also deserve consideration by a new morality. In analytical work these issues are no less urgent than sexuality. Yet because the new morality seems to make its case in terms of love and sexuality, and because love and sexuality are the contemporary banners under which even educational, legal, and political battles are fought, we are obliged to turn to this question too. Nevertheless, the real revolution going on in the individual soul is not so much sexual as it is psychic and symbolic, a struggle for a wholly new (yet most ancient and religious) experience of reality which only happens to be carried for us in its nascence by a sexual fantasy of this psychic reality.

Let us look first at the answer to the problems of love and sexuality given by the "new morality." The new morality appears to hold that fornication and adultery, as long as it is between consenting adults, as long as it is not in public, as long as it is meaningful and deep and not harming, as long as it is founded upon love, that is, recognition of the person of the other, is not morally wrong. In fact, Bishop Robinson says:

…assertions about God are in the last analysis assertions about Love—about the ultimate ground and meaning of personal relationship.3 Belief in God is the trust, the well-nigh incredible trust, that to give ourselves to the uttermost in love is not to be confounded but to be "accepted," that Love is the ground of our being, to which ultimately we "come home." 4

Are "meaningfulness," "transcendence," "depth," and "harmlessness" adequate criteria for the justification of one's love, since upon this love fornication and adultery are justified? Or more—since upon these criteria God Himself is recognized? Are there not gradations of transcendence, so that all that lies on the other side of my ego's borders, all that transcends it, need not be called ultimate and divine? Is there without involvement and involvement without harm? What do the myths of Cupid, of the Trojan wars, of history's great loving couples, of our own lives, tell us? Even if love gives meaning and healing, it opens new wounds as it closes old ones, and it provides no surety against its sometimes destructive wake.

Love can be taken at many levels, and the consulting room of the analyst or the pastoral counselor will be the ending place for many a love in which people have given themselves to the uttermost, met the ultimate, with noble intentions and deep feelings, asserting that their love was the ground of their existence, their sense of homecoming, even their experience of God and

transcendence—and yet it all went wrong, dreadfully, horribly, sometimes suicidally wrong.

The question which we must raise against the "new morality" is not whether it is morally, or even theologically, sound or not, but rather whether it is *psychologically* valid. Is *Honest to God* true to life? By removing God from out there or up there to the depths, the most powerful and numinous image has been placed suddenly in the territory which was formerly the devil's dominion; and how are we to judge from whence come the impulses of love which call from these depths? How do we discriminate the spirits rising from the deep?

For let us make no mistake, the overwhelming emphasis upon personal relationships in the new morality—upon their depth, totality, and commitment—leads inevitably into the issue of sexual relationships. It is rare to have the one without the other, unless a great deal of psychological cultivation has been accomplished. By standing for the sexual implications of total commitment, at least the new morality is courageous. But again, is it psychologically valid?

Sexuality is not only a creative gift we bestow upon another, it is also a demonic force. Myths showing the cultivation of consciousness, such as the ones of Hercules and Ulysses, and the Gilgamesh epic too, as well as primitive initiation rituals, indicate that the demonic aspect is to be tamed or avoided, sacrificed or withstood. We must know something about the inner darkness which contaminates our love. The shadow aspect of sexuality—especially in our long-repressed culture—must first become freed of its incestuous components, must first become connected with love and relatedness, that is, must first be cultivated and developed. The new morality makes insufficient distinctions; it has one main criterion: depth. But the depth psychologist knows something about what lies down there. Dream images, fairy tales, and myths tell us enough of the netherworld of mother-imagos, of beasts and fires, of

false brides and monsters, which must first be confronted by the hero before he is able to come into his kingdom and enter man's estate, before he is human and can understand what the Bishop of Woolwich means by love. Love romanticized is a sweet-cheat answer to the dried and technical world; love romanticized is only the reverse, the enantiodromia from boy-Faustian efficiency into left-behind school-boy longings. Only too often, as analysts and counselors know, in the noble aim of deep personal love when we would give our uttermost love we give our nether-most beast to someone else to keep for us.

To presume that every experience of love is Love of the Divine Ground of Being, to imagine that deep personal meaningfulness surmounts the pitch and hurdles of love's intricacies and can be the criterion for justification of unsanctified love, to be cozened into love by a philosophy which neglects its fearfulness (for if God is love, then the beginning of wisdom is the fear of love), and to call this naive ignorance of the shadow side of loving "Honest to God" is witness just to how much of love lies in shadow. Better to call the new morality of loving "Naive to God." A psychologist, lay in these matters of theology, nevertheless expects more from a "new reformation" than the mere replacement of a naive God-image "up there" by a naive love concept "in here." Although it is written that God is all love, does this mean that all love is God? When love is worshiped as God—and no matter the form this love takes, the lover who gives it, its heights or depths—have we not fashioned an idol, thereby crossing the second and third commandments? And are not these the commandments which bear more upon theological morality than the seventh and tenth, with which ministers today seem so fascinated? A psychologist must ask his clerical colleagues: why are you prey to these sophistries, these simple solutions; why do you blur the hierarchies of transcendence and ultimacy, neglecting the worlds of difference, represented traditionally by planes of being and classes of angels,

between the levels and kinds of love; why do you traffic in hallucinogens, finding in them beatific visions; why do you confuse the voices of autonomous complexes with the Pentecostal gift of tongues; how can you equate falling-in-love with coming home to the God-head?

Love is more complex than its emotions, just as God mystery, not enthusiasms. The differentiation of its complexities is a long initiation, only the beginning of which is falling into it, being ignited by its smoke and fire. Love would be elucidated: led into light. (In the same way, theology as the study of God is a long process of elucidation, a labyrinthine way.) We are ultimately helpless before the archetypal experience of love and we understand little; even its epiphanies are only openings into yet more possibilities of loving. No one would be bold enough to believe himself a theologian overnight, yet some claim as much for themselves after one night of love. And what of those who have not the power nor known that glory of giving themselves to the uttermost in love? Are they then cut off from the Kingdom? It appears as if there is in the new morality of the new reformation an old doctrine of predestination, of "ins" and "outs": in love or left out.

In other words, the new morality for all its boldness in giving to Jesus' message of love a vital modern interpretation is not psychologically valid because it offers a general answer. Yet there are no general answers effective in moral conflicts; psychologically, moral conflicts are individually suffered through crises which codes and preaching do not touch. In a true moral conflict, which is the forge of personality and character intensification, the individual is alone to hammer out his own answer in his heart. The moral code is the anvil, the individual crisis the hammer. For psychological culture, what matters is that there be these conflicts. A morality which would remove the source of conflict, ease the role of guilt, and diminish the importance of

being torn on the cross of oppositions is no longer a morality but a new theological tranquilizer called Love.

The analytical viewpoint supports moral codes because moral codes perform two functions: first, they intensify conflict, without which consciousness is not possible; and second, they favor internalization. The moral code is supported by analysis not merely for the sake of outer morality, for social form and ethics. Analysis is concerned with the development of love, the eros, the sexuality within the individual. This development is not favored by acting-out. As the shadow side is not developed by repression, so is it equally not favored by repression's opposite, acting-out. Repression and acting-out are two sides of the same coin. A third way may be called internalization, or symbolization, or living-in. Eros is cultivated through intense internalization, perhaps the most difficult of all activities, since eros by definition and impulse leads us into the world and involvements with others. Living-eros-in is therefore indeed an opus contra naturam. The love impulse itself has within it the cultural seeds of internalization and symbolization; these are not sublimations above imposed by will, reason, or social ethics. These cultural seeds are the self-governing, self-inhibiting regulation of instinct itself through conscience; ritual and fantasy. Love-poetry, love-letters, love-gifts, are all gestures not reducible to functional sexuality, but are, even among animals in the form of courtship and mating rituals, the dance and color of love itself. The liberating imaginative play which accompanies being-in-love is part of eros itself and points to the way in which opus contra naturam is, paradoxically, also natural and instinctual.

All mystical discipline recognized the importance of internalization for the cultivation of eros and impose intense structures on erotic life. I do not want to prescribe the practices of asceticism not to proscribe living love as it happens in the world. Internalization is not the only way nor is it always the way, but a case and argument needs to be made for it since it has all but been

forgotten in today's so-called sexual revolution and since it is in the main the analytical way. To point to the psychological significance of ascetic practices therefore may be useful, even if the practices themselves are not our concern. In studying them we are confronted with a universal awareness and an archetypal teaching that the human being—as a distinction of his very humanity—needs to be initiated into love's mysteries. Yet if God is love, is this a wonder?

Traditional disciplines, of which alchemy was one, were mainly concerned with the transformation of consciousness, or what we might call personality development in the deepest sense. The redemption of the inferior personality, in particular the inferior eros—unlovingness, selfishness, attachment without involvement, vanity and superficiality, primitivity of sexuality and sexualization of feeling, haste and compulsiveness, wasted energy in repetitive erotic fantasy—is also a main concern of analysis. Therefore one can learn about personality development from these mystic disciplines such as alchemy.

In Chinese and Westem alchemy, before one began the great opus, the experiment with one's nature, one had to search one's heart and examine one's moral attitudes. The cardinal virtues were recommended: health, humility, holiness, chastity, faith, hope, love, kindness, prayer, patience, moderation, and so on. In one way or another, these virtues came into alchemy again and again. It was an intensely moral business. Similarly intense moralities can be found in Yoga, in Catholic disciplines, in Sufism, in Shamanism, in Zen, etc.

There was a definite spiritual idealism, a strong moralism, and we must ask why this morality is necessary. The alchemist recognized the inner darkness, the shadow side of the personality, which was released when the eros aspect was undergoing transformation. Morality offered a containing bulwark against the corrosive, explosive, sulphuric sides of nature—that is, the

repressed affects and desires. The moral principles were practical guides for dealing with the violent sinner God. He, as *Solniger* or *Deus absconditus*, could demolish the creation from below just as the One on High sends down His locusts, lightning, and floods.

Morality as something imposed from above is derived from the theological model of a God-up-there. But this theological model is itself based on an archetypal idea, a statement of the psyche that something there is which is above and beyond itself. The soul is not all; there is something beyond it. If all statements are fundamentally reflections of the psyche, then the claims of the old theology that perfection is upward and that spirit is superior to psyche and body are admonitions of the soul to itself, saying, "Look up!" Placing God down in the deep will entail a new morality, perhaps. This morality will aim toward the transcendent immanent—that is, the deeply-within which is at the same time beyond. This within which is beyond is imaged in alchemy as the luminous eyes of the fish in the deep seas which are at the same time the distant stars above. The within which is beyond the Eastern language is the *suksma* aspect which is beyond the exoteric material level of things. In our language it is psychic reality beyond the ego level. The beyond within is the ultimate aim of the inner connection; a self-connectedness which is common to all beyond the ego. This realm of psychic reality always points beyond itself, transcends itself, and therefore it imposes a morality which demands a process of transcending, always going deeper, farther. We might call this the moral impulse of the individuation process. But wherever the ultimate value is placed, whether God is above or within, it is the "beyond" aspect which guides the moral impulse. Thus moral virtues remain as psychological imperatives, as calls from something beyond the ego, regardless of the locus of the theological God.

So in addition to the need for moral conflict, we now have the second psychological reason for morality. The development of

personality itself imposes rules upon the ego. The personality as a whole demands that the ego as a part make sacrifices. The ego is limited by these values and principles, which are "super" ego in that they are above the ego, in that they transcend the ego. The process of transformation imposes these limitations upon the ego so that it can serve the process in the right way. In this light, these attitudes, these concepts of traditional morality, are transcendental values, as Kantian and Idealist philosophy has always held that the cardinal virtues are transcendental. However, from the analytical viewpoint they are psychologically transcendental. They are not hypostasized virtues floating around Heaven, or in a Platonic world, or in a Germanic metaphysical empyrean. They are rather the limitations and imperatives placed by the wholeness of the Self upon the ego to force it to internalizations. As such they transcend the ego. They are experienced as transcendental by the ego so that transgression of them awakens guilt. This guilt is toward one's own possibility of self-realization, or self-redemption. The moral impulse of conscience therefore plays a significant role in the process of self-development.

Jung's essay on conscience was written toward the end of his life. It was published recently in English for the first time in Volume Ten of his Collected Works. He describes two forms of conscience. There is the conscience which we gain through learning, through the inculcation of values from our parents and our peers, from the traditional dogma of religions about right and wrong, and which we might call the superego. However, there is another sort of conscience, because, as he says, "The phenomenon of conscience in itself does not coincide with the moral code, but is anterior to it, transcends its contents. . . ." The superego, the first sort of conscience, is, in fact, secondary. I mean by this that we can only take in certain principles and follow a moral code and obey our parents' and our religions' teachings because of the psychological faculty of conscience, the inborn capacity to feel

guilt. Conscience is a psychological function *sui generis*. Conscience is the voice of self-guidance. The self-regulating, self-steering activity of the psyche gives to conscience its authority. We may alter moral codes or even do away with morality, but we cannot do away with the psychological phenomenon of conscience.

Conscience, as an aspect of self-regulation, is the voice of the Self, which may and does conflict with thé contents of a superego conscience. Then a man is led into the dilemma of individual conscience versus collective moral code, between conscience per se and its contents. This is the stuff of great literature and of daily counseling. Organized religion has long recognized this conflict of voices within, and has rightly called it a struggle between dark and light, evil and good. Unfortunately, organized religion has been too sure about which was the dark and which the light, too quick to identify its ethic with the good ethic.

I say "unfortunately" because in moral conflicts, good is often divided against itself; the Old King's voice of the superego and the voice of the Self yet-to-be-born who speaks through the Divine Child are both right. Out of these conflicts a new psychological standpoint can come, which we might also call a new morality. This psychological standpoint is a shift in position of the personality, away from onesidedness and toward a more central truth. This truth admits, and then in time brings into conscious life, strands of the shadow which hitherto had not been allowed. Power drives become working ambition, deceits become social lies, fear of failure becomes open weakness, sexual fantasies become lived relationships. Integration of the shadow transforms the shadow. The qualities are no longer so dark when they are brought into the light of day and one has the courage both to give them rein and yet hold them in check. From the psychological point of view repression is not only an Evil and integration a Good, but repression is an origin of evil and integration a redemption of it.

The inner necessity which forces the Old King to alter his views speaks at first with the still small voice of individual conscience. In dreams, at times, it is a child in danger, ill, wounded, drowning, lost . . . or it can be an imprisoned criminal, a social outcast, an enemy alien, a man with another skin, creed, race, or an animal that cannot be destroyed, relentlessly pursuing like the Hound of Heaven . . . and one feels guilt, a sense of responsibility, a need to do something. Somewhere, there is a pressing necessity, and we are not doing what we should. This "should," for all its bearded, sick, childish, grotesque forms, is the growing side of ourselves: helpless without our care, young to challenge our nourishing heart, ill to constellate the nurse in us, pursuing because we run from it, in jail because we have judged it, dark because we have not let it into the light. This "should" is the command of the self-regulative function of the personality; each time we are being urged to realize a central core of the personality. Jung has called these dynamic centers the archetypes. The archetype particularly involved during the darkness is the archetypal shadow, none other than the Devil.

Confrontation with one's own darkness leads into those intense moral issues which are eternal, archetypal experiences of both growth and destruction. The human task in dealing with the shadow is to separate its strands by careful differentiation with thought and feeling of the experiences and images as they come, in order to release the disguised redeemer and to keep watch over the disguised destroyer. As the strands are usually so mixed, we cannot encourage the one without keeping one eye always on the Devil.

This brings us to a third and last psychological reason for morality: the struggle with evil. From the viewpoint of analytic practice, this third ground of morality is perhaps yet more important than the two already discussed: the need for moral conflicts and the need for internalizations.

The deepest level of the inner darkness, of the shadow, goes beyond your or my personal sins, crimes, negligences and omissions. Below these are experiences of evil which cannot be humanized and which have been represented by devilish powers in the various religions of the world. We have lived through times in Europe in the thirties and forties and they have continued in Algeria, in Tibet, in Southeast Asia and in the southeastern United States—which reveal the strength of these forces. Evil may well be a deprivation of the good theologically, but until the good comes on the scene until the deprivation is restored, the experience of that evil is psychologically very real indeed. And the sufferer suffers not so much from a deprivation as from a very present, acutely effective evil. It is absolute, cruelly true there. Archetypal evil can neither be cured nor integrated nor humanized. It can only be held at bay. This point has been made with unremitting insistence by Dr. Adolf Guggenbuhl-Craig in his Cutting Lectures at Andover-Newton Theological School. The experience of evil in forms of willful persecution, of vindictive victimizing, of destructive suffering, exploitation, physical pain and torment, have in them always something other than the demonic. "Something other" than the demonic can only be the human; it is the human element in the Devil that gives evil its full reality.

The demonic or diabolic in itself is arbitrary, mischievous, often a matter of luck or lot. It comes and goes and seems so senseless. The more that evil is archetypal, the more we experience it as impersonal. It is incomprehensible and we do not deserve it. (The same language has been used by recipients of God's goodness: "I am undeserving"; "it surpasseth my understanding.") Evil to some extent becomes more comprehensible and acceptable when it can be linked to something human, such as the sins of ancestral generations or the personal motivation of an enemy. When evil takes on godly form (Loki, Lucifer, Hermes-Mercury, the Trickster), it has a double nature and, like the spirit, it can blow for

ill or good. It reaches its enormity only when it is half-human. When it is joined with the human ego, the will and reason and desire with which a man can choose a course of action and pursue an end, then does the merely devilish become truly evil. This implies that the archetypal shadow never achieves full actuality until it is linked in a pact with the human. And we are driven to conclude that the Devil too would incarnate in and through man.

Only morality defends me from this pact, from incarnating in my life, with my will and reason and desire, the Devil's intention. This leads one to appreciate anew the value of morality—for with what else but morality can the psyche protect itself against this force? In this sense, all morality does come from the Devil; morality is the psyche's answer to its own evil capabilities. Or, perhaps, at the level of inhuman power, we can hardly differentiate for sure between the sources of evil and morality. From the human standpoint, as met in the analytical session, the source of both seems to be the same: transcendent.

Arbitrary fateful happenings come from beyond as does the moral impulse itself. The events of fate can be humanized positively or negatively, as tragedies which ennoble us or as cruelties that sow destructive seeds into future generations. Human morality may not be able to alter the facts of fate, but it can at least prevent the archetypal shadow from direct incarnation. Human morality can and does protect from acting evil out, just as human kindness does soften fate's blows.

The Devil's power seems to grow not in our shadow but from our light. He gains when we lose touch with our own darkness, when we lose sight of our own destructiveness and self-deceptions. Theology says that pride leads directly to the devil; psychology can confirm this since, analytically seen, pride is a denial of the personal shadow and a blind fascination with the dazzle of one's own light. Therefore the best protection is not the reinforcement of the good and the light, but familiarity with one's own shadow, one's

own devil-likeness. Homeopathic dosage of lesser evils as bitter pills of moral pain may be prophylactic against the greater evil. To err is human; to have shadow and be in shadow is human. To cast no shadow is possible only to the divine and the demonic. The human casts no shadow only at noon, only at the dazzle and zenith of his pride. But noon is also Pan's hour, so that at our greatest height we are in danger of the greatest fall. Pan drives out civilized morality in rebellious panic, intoxication and goatiness. He is not dead at all, but appears now as Lucifer's heir, from below and within, as the ambivalent "prince of this world," bringing a confusion of vitality and darkness together, a monstrous mixture in the name of Dionysian renewal. Our obsessions with ecstasy, with rebirth through unconsciousness—whether through music, or LSD, or orgasm, or riots—show the paws and hoofs of Pan-Dionysos. Any psychology or theology which attempts the real depths will have to recognize Pan and his influence from these depths upon our love and upon our fear.

Finally, the reality of the shadow in counseling means that honesty is a grace that we cannot expect—neither from those who come to us and from ourselves to them, nor from anyone to God. The Devil and our devil-likeness means treachery, even when we have the best intentions. This is the reality of evil. Darkness is never dispersed as long as we are human and walk in the shadow of original sin and Lucifer is the original son. The lie and the cheat are ever present; and even honesty from God can be doubted, since in the case of Job He gave His ear to Satan. Facing the reality of evil, however, does not mean cynicism. It means merely that the optimism of honest-to-God be shaded in with the pessimism of psychological reality. To be honest-to-God we would first have to know a great deal more about truth—and what is truth? A hint toward knowledge of the whole truth might be found through a psychological reappraisal of the enigmatic robbers and thieves surrounding Jesus during his last human hours.

The reality of the shadow implies a recognition within the individual counselor of his own vast and collective unconscious, the shadows of his own soul, for just this ignorance of these shadows above all else has been responsible for the long decline of his profession and our faith. The tallest shade in these depths is the same today as always: that sin of pride, the identification with the Christ figure, which can come especially to the fore now in support of the role of pastoral counselor. Today the effects of this identification will be worse since it is a "dead God," one gone wrong, decayed, in the ferment of disintegration and resurrection, that catches the minister from behind so that he can no longer discriminate the spirits and tell who is behind whom: Christ, Devil or his own complexes. At the shadowy soft edges of the contemporary picture, Christianity and criminality may seep into each other. To the martyr-complex of the suffering-servant and the hero-complex of the soldier-of-Christ so much can be justified! When our time is in the dark confusion of Golgotha one need be only a degree or two off course, left or right, and one is kneeling before a thief.

The instrument which consciousness has in its hands for judging values, for holding to moral worth, for recognition of the human and personal in the best sense, for keeping connections going and flowing, for dignity and decency and kindness, is the function of feeling. If feeling gives the redeeming human touch, then the greatest danger is the capture and possession of feeling by the devil (in Mercuric capriciousness, in Satanic coldness, in wild affects of Pan). The moral sense has long been considered an attribute of the feeling function. Moral codes guard against deficiencies of feeling through emphasis upon manners and customs. Moral codes judge errors in the light of the intentions of the agent and the feeling context of situations rather than upon logical and empirical mistakes. So, too, psychopathy or sociopathic behavior, generally held as vicious or evil and once called moral

insanity, shows itself in the deficiencies of feelings of guilt and feelings of loving participation in common humanity.

The dilemmas of the shadow which I have touched upon in the last part of this chapter—that is, (1) separating individual self-regulatory conscience from revealed or collective superego conscience, and (2) separating the strands of the shadow which can be lived and integrated from those which irredeemably belong in Hell—these two tasks lead into the wider realm of feeling. The education or cultivation of the feeling side in turn leads into our inner femininity, to which we shall now devote the last chapter.